

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3008
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 07096

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY AND RABAT FOR SAUNDERS

U.S. DEL 2 FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ATHERTON, ALFRED L., JR.)
SUBJECT: ATHERTON TALKING POINTS FOR TALKS IN SAUDI
ARABIA AND JORDAN

1. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS BASED ON GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY SECRETARY IN LONDON WHICH I PROPOSE TO USE FOR MY TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY CHANGES OR FURTHER GUIDANCE YOU MAY HAVE SENT TO CAIRO FOR DELIVERY TO ME WHEN WE TRANSIT CAIRO 1420 LOCAL TIME SATURDAY, JULY 22. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE SENT TO JIDDA BY OPENING OF BUSINESS SUNDAY FOR EARLY DELIVERY TO ME IN TAIF BEFORE MY TALKS WITH SAUDIS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY SAUDIS MAY WANT TO MEET SATURDAY EVENING.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

OBJECTIVES

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YOUR STOPS IN BOTH PLACES WILL HAVE AS THEIR OBJECTIVE
(A) THE FORESHADOWING OF ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS WITH THE SECRETARY PRESENT,
(B) PERSUADING THEM OF THE REASONS FOR AN IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUITY IN THIS KIND OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS, AND
(C) EXPLAINING TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS HOW WE ENVISAGE

OUR ROLE, INCLUDING THE PUTTING FORTH OF U.S. SUGGESTIONS, IN THE TALKS DURING THE SECRETARY'S TRIP. YOU WILL NOT WANT TO GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT OUR IDEAS IN EITHER PLACE BUT SHOULD OUTLINE THE CONCEPT OF OUR AAAROACH AND EXPLAIN SOME OF THE MAIN AREAS WHERE WE BELIEVE THE ARABS WILL HAVE TO COMPROMISE. IN SAUDI ARABIA, YOU WILL SEEK AT A MINIMUM THEIR AGREEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO SUPPORT THESE TALKS AND TO SAY SO TO BOTH SADAT AND HUSSEIN; AND TO ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HE WILL JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN JORDAN, YOU WILL WANT TO SEEK (A) HIS ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS, AND (B) A CLEAR STATEMENT TO US OF WHAT HE REQUIRES IN ORDER TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO LEAD OFF BY BRIEFING BOTH GOVERNMENTS ON THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS.

TALKING POINTS

A. BRIEFING ON LEEDS TALKS

--SECRETARY VANCE ASKED ME TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA (JORDAN) BECAUSE HE WISHED YOU TO HAVE A FIRST-HAND AND PROMPT REPORT ON THE LEEDS TALKS AS WELL AS TO HAVE FRANK DIS-
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CUSSIONS WITH YOU ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS WE ENVISAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS - BOTH TO EXPLAIN OUR VIEWS AND TO RECEIVE YOURS.

--AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED, WE FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THESE TALKS FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THERE IS A PERCEPTION IN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL THAT EGYPT BROKE OFF NEGOTIATIONS LAST JANUARY. WE CANNOT PLAY THE ROLE OUR ARAB FRIENDS EXPECT OF US IN A NEGOTIATING VACUUM. WE KNOW THEY ARE SKEPTICAL OF THE USEFULNESS OF DIRECT TALKS BUT HOPE THEY UNDERSTAND THAT, IF WE ARE TO PLAY THAT ROLE, WE MUST DO IT OUR WAY IF WE ARE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT WE NEED IN PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A SERIOUS, GENUINE ONGOING NEGOTIATING PROCESS - NOT JUST PRO FORMA.

--SECOND, THE VERY PROCESS OF DIRECT TALKS DOES CREATE A DYNAMIC IN WHICH EACH OTHER'S VIEWS CAN BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD, POSITIONS CAN BE REASSESSED WITHIN EACH SIDE'S POLITICAL PROCESS, AND PERCEPTIONS AND POSITIONS CAN BEGIN TO CHANGE.

--THE LEEDS TALKS WERE SERIOUS AND PURPOSEFUL. NO
BREAKTHROUGH ON THE KEY ISSUES WAS ACHIEVED BUT THE
ISSUES WERE SUBJECTED TO THE MOST SEARCHING EXAMINATION
THAT HAS OCCURRED THUS FAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER
SIDE RESORTED TO RHETORIC AND NEITHER ALLOWED THE
"LEGALISMS" OF ITS POSITION TO OVERSHADOW A GENUINE

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY AND RABAT FOR SAUNDERS

U.S. DEL 2 FROM ATHERTON

EFFORT TO EXPLORE THE AREAS WHERE COMMON GROUND MIGHT
BE EXPANDED. BOTH SIDES ADDRESSED PENETRATING QUESTIONS
TO THE OTHER, AND BOTH SIDES ANSWERED FRANKLY, SOME-
TIMES BLUNTLY.

--OUR AGENDA WAS THE TWO PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE
PARTIES ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (THE DISCUSSIONS DID
NOT GET INTO SINAI ISSUES). BOTH PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT UNTIL NOW NEITHER
HAD BEEN DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY, CONFIDENTIALLY AND IN
DEPTH. THIS OCCURRED DURING THE TWO DAYS, AND THIS
WAS IN ITSELF IMPORTANT.

--THE EGYPTIANS STATED THEIR CASE VERY EFFECTIVELY.
THEY TALKED WITH CONSIDERABLE SPECIFICITY ABOUT THE
MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE PUT INTO EFFECT TO ENSURE
ISRAEL'S SECURITY, ALWAYS STRESSING THAT THESE COULD ONLY
BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT
TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS REQUIRED

BY S.C. RESOLUTION 242, AND TO SOME FORM OF SELF-

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DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

--WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WERE IMPRESSED BY THE
SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE EGYPTIANS APPROACHED THIS
ASPECT. DAYAN EXPLAINED ISRAEL'S CONVICTIONS THAT A
RETURN TO THE 1949 ARMISTICE LINES IN THIS SECTOR
COULD NOT GIVE ISRAEL THE SECURITY IT SEEKS AND ISRAEL'S
STRONG PREFERENCE FOR A DIFFERENT TYPE OF SOLUTION --
ONE IN WHICH ISRAEL ENSURED ITS SECURITY BY RETAINING
SIGNIFICANT RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY, AT THE SAME
TIME GRANTING THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTONOMY, WHILE DEFERRING FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS
ANY DECISION ON THE ULTIMATE STATUS OF THESE
TERRITORIES AND MAKING NO COMMITMENT NOW TO EVENTUAL
COMPLETE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL.

--ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL, NAMELY WHAT COULD BE DONE
ON THE GROUND TO BEGIN TO CHANGE THE SITUATION OF THE
PAST ELEVEN YEARS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, SOME
SIGNIFICANT COMMON GROUND HAS EMERGED.

--BOTH AGREE THAT THE PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT
FORWARD ARE IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING COMPREHENSIVE,
NORMAL, PEACEFUL RELATIONS IN THE AREA EMBODIED IN
PEACE TREATIES.

--BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE STATUS QUO SHOULD BE
CHANGED.

--BOTH AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN END OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT AND THAT FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, NEW RELATION-
SHIPS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH NEED NOT BE A FINAL
SOLUTION.

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--BOTH AGREE THAT THE INHABITANTS SHOULD ELECT
REPRESENTATIVES TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS DURING THIS
PERIOD.

--BOTH AGREE ON THE NEED FOR SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGE-
MENTS DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD.

--BOTH AGREE THAT JORDAN AND EGYPT, IN ADDITION TO ISRAEL AND THE INHABITANTS, HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY DURING THE FIVE YEARS.

--THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, THE DIFFERENCES WERE NARROWED. EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE FRANK STATEMENTS WE HEARD OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPTS UNDERLYING EACH SIDE'S APPROACH SERVED TO BRING THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF BASIC DISAGREEMENT MORE SHARPLY INTO FOCUS AND THUS DEFINE MORE CLEARLY THE SPECIFIC POINTS ON WHICH NEGOTIATING EFFORTS MUST CONCENTRATE.

--ISRAEL WANTS TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN/ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHILE DEFERRING DECISIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE TERRITORY AND THE STATUS OF ISRAEL IN THAT TERRITORY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS.

--EGYPT WANTS TO DEAL WITH BOTH QUESTIONS TOGETHER AND TO SEPARATE QUESTIONS OF SECURITY FROM QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY. EGYPT SEES NO STATUS FOR ISRAEL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXCEPT IN A CLEARLY DEFINED SECURITY ROLE.

--THESE ARE BASIC DIFFICULTIES, AND WE MUST SEEK A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA THEY POSE. IN OUR VIEW, A RESOLUTION OF THIS DILEMMA MUST BE APPROACHED ON THE BASIS OF THE SECRET

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY AND RABAT FOR SAUNDERS

U.S. DEL 2 FROM ATHERTON

ONLY AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE -- RESOLUTION 242.

B. NEXT STEPS

--THE LEEDS TALKS WERE IN OUR VIEW USEFUL AND NECESSARY. THESE TWO DAYS DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE THE ONLY WAY EACH DISPUTANT CAN HEAR THE CONCERNS, OBJECTIVES AND POLITICAL IMPERATIVES THAT ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTHER'S POLICIES, AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF SEEKING OUT AREAS OF ACCOMMODATION.

--WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IN ITSELF CAN BRIDGE THE GAP ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, WHICH REMAINS WIDE. THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTEXT WE WILL HAVE TO PUT FORWARD OUR OWN IDEAS ON HOW THE GAPS CAN BE BRIDGED. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PLAY THIS ROLE AND HAS CERTAIN IDEAS IN MIND.

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--WHEN WE DO SO, IT WILL DIFFER FUNDAMENTALLY FROM WHAT ARE SOMETIMES REGARDED AS PREVIOUS "U.S. PEACE PLANS." WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN PUTTING FORWARD AN ABSTRACT PLAN THAT WILL JOIN OTHERS AND FORGOTTEN DOCUMENTS. WE ARE DETERMINED TO FIND COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS THAT THE TWO SIDES THEMSELVES PUT FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

--WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE IDEAS WE PUT FORWARD EMERGE IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTIVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND BE BASED ON THE PROPOSALS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. IT IS ONLY IN THIS CONTEXT - ONE IN WHICH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE MAKING A GENUINE EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS - THAT U.S. IDEAS CAN BE ACCEPTED. CHARGES OF AN "IMPOSED" U.S. PLAN WILL BE HEARD IN ANY EVENT, BUT IT IS VITAL THAT WE GIVE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR SUCH A CHARGE.

--WE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE SOME IDEA OF OUR CONCEPT OF WHERE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED.

--THE FIRST BASIC POINT IS THAT WE HAVE CONCLUDED, AFTER MANY MONTHS OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE, THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA ARE TOO COMPLICATED TO BE SOLVED IN ONE BITE AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH SOME TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT TO ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO TAKE FIRST STEPS, WHILE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE TESTED AND CONDITIONS EMERGE WHICH MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS OF FINAL TERMS POSSIBLE.

--WE ARE THINKING THEREFORE OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
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OF FIVE YEARS (THE BASIC CONCEPT HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES) WHICH WOULD GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION BOTH TO THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS OF THESE TERRITORIES AND TO THE CONTINUING SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

--A TRANSITIONAL REGIME, DERIVING ITS AUTHORITY FROM AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES, COULD BE ESTABLISHED TO REPLACE THE EXISTING MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

--ISRAELI TROOPS COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO DESIGNATED AREAS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND IN DESIGNATED NUMBERS.

--THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT COULD BE EMBODIED IN A FREELY-ELECTED GOVERNING COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ADMINISTER THE TERRITORIES.

--PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY WOULD BE THE BUSINESS OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ACTS OR THREATS AGAINST ISRAELI SECURITY.

--A SPECIAL SUPERVISORY ROLE MIGHT BE GIVEN TO JORDAN IN THE WEST BANK AND TO EGYPT IN GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

--THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES WOULD AGREE THAT DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED, AND AGREEMENT REACHED, ON THE TERMS OF A PEACE TREATY ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF PEACE, MEASURES TO ENSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY FOLLOWING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS.

--THE PEACE TREATY WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN EXPRESSION OF
CONSENT TO ITS TERMS BY THE POPULACE.

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY AND RABAT FOR SAUNDERS

U.S. DEL 2 FROM ATHERTON

--IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
ON A DOCUMENT EMBODYING BROAD PRINCIPLES WE STRONGLY
BELIEVE IT COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR JORDAN TO JOIN
THE NEGOTIATIONS.

--A WORD ABOUT THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. WE MUST
EMPHASIZE WE DO NOT THINK IT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME
TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES ON THE DETAILS OF
A FINAL TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA. THE GAP IS TOO WIDE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
CERTAINLY NO PRIOR COMMITMENT IS POSSIBLE TO TOTAL
WITHDRAWAL OR COMPLETELY UNCONDITIONAL PALESTINIAN SELF-
DETERMINATION. BUT IT WOULD BE A MAJOR
ACHIEVEMENT IN ITSELF TO BRING ISRAEL TO COMMIT ITSELF TO
NEGOTIATE A TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN FIVE YEARS TIME
BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND PROVIDING FOR

PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR
FUTURE ALONG THE LINES OF THE ASWAN FORMULA.

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--IN SUMMARY, THEREFORE, WE ENVISAGE AN APPROACH WHICH
WORKS BOTH ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL, NEGOTIATING NEW
ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL GIVE TIME FOR THE SITUATION TO
EVOLVE; AND ON THE LEVEL OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
SETTING IN MOTION A PROCESS FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A
FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242.

--IN OUR VIEW, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A CONTINUITY
OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SO THAT ANY U.S. IDEAS
BE SEEN AS EVOLVING ORGANICALLY FROM THE POSITIONS
OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. SECRETARY VANCE HAS TALKED
WITH BOTH SIDES ABOUT ARRANGING ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS,
AND HE HAS INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN
THOSE TALKS. THE SECRETARY'S TRIP WOULD TAKE PLACE IN
EARLY AUGUST. WE ARE MOVING RAPIDLY TO THE POINT
WHERE A DECISIVE EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO ACHIEVE AGREE-
MENT ON THE BROAD PRINCIPLES OF A WEST BANK/GAZA
SETTLEMENT, IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OVERALL
PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AND ON MODALITIES
FOR ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD INCLUDE JORDAN
AND, ULTIMATELY, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIANS
AND SYRIA.

--(FOR THE SAUDIS) WE ARE NOW REACHING A CULMINATING
POINT IN THE PROCESS LAUNCHED BY THE SADAT INITIATIVE
WHERE AN AGREED DOCUMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ON
PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE
ACHIEVABLE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SADAT BE SUPPORTED
IN BEING ABLE TO PLAY HIS PART IN THE COMING MONTHS
SO THAT THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WE HAVE IN MIND CAN
UNFOLD. WE URGE THE SAUDIS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT
FOR SADAT UNTIL WE SEE WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

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--JORDAN'S WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE
AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON A GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES
WILL BE A VITAL ELEMENT IN CONTINUING TO BUILD ON THE
SADAT INITIATIVE. WE WILL BE GOING TO AMMAN, AS
OUR NEXT STOP TO TALK WITH THE KING OURSELVES. WE
HOPE THE SAUDIS WILL ALSO BE WILLING TO USE THEIR

INFLUENCE WITH THE KING TO DEVELOP A MORE POSITIVE
ATTITUDE TOWARD JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

--(FOR THE JORDANIANS) JORDAN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT OF
SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAL PROPOSAL WAS MOST HELPFUL. WE
HOPE THE KING WILL MAINTAIN THAT SUPPORT IN COMING WEEKS
AS WE ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH
SECRETARY VANCE'S PARTICIPATION. WE ARE REACHING A
CULMINATING POINT IN THE SADAT INITIATIVE AND IT
IS VITAL THAT SADAT BE SUPPORTED SO THAT OUR NEGOTIATING
STRATEGY CAN UNFOLD.

--JORDAN'S JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE A FRAMEWORK OF
PRINCIPLES IS ACHIEVED WILL BECOME VITAL. WE NEED
TO KNOW IN MORE PRECISE TERMS THAN THE KING HAS GIVEN
US TO DATE WHAT HE FEELS HE NEEDS TO TAKE THIS STEP.
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